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Scenes from the Imperialistic Self-Defense: Healing Image or the Law of Laws 
 
“Let me say from the outset that it would be a mistake to make Fanon into a clay model 
for revolution,” Gayatri Spivak tells me. I’ve asked her about Göran Olson’s celebrated 
2014 documentary, Concerning Violence: Nine Scenes from the Anti-Imperialistic Self-
Defense, which she appears in, reading a preface at the start of the film.1 Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak is a Founding Member of the Institute for Comparative Literature 
and Society at Columbia University and widely acknowledged as one of the most 
important thinkers and literary critics of our time. In 2012 she received the Kyoto Prize 
in Arts and Philosophy, considered by some an equivalent to the Nobel Prize in the 
areas not recognized by the latter. To many of us she is a teacher, a friend, and the 
author of an influential body of work that includes A Critique of Postcolonial Reason 
and more recently a translation of Aimé Césaire’s play A Season in the Congo.2 Her 
participation in Olson’s documentary revealed a new facet in Spivak’s work and career: 
not just a film critic, but as I would like to present her in this piece (after Fanon, the 
protagonist of the film) a photo-electric analyst of the time dimension, the law of laws 
according to Jean Epstein.3 
 She engages Olson’s film in signature critical mode. As a counterpoint to the 
documentary, her preface-appearance avoids the often-repeated story of Fanon as a 
 champion of counter-violence. “Instead,” she says, “one must understand that in the 
initial chapters of The Wretched of the Earth, which a lot of people read as an apology of 
violence, Fanon is actually claiming complicity with what was surrounding him. That is, 
the violence of colonization.” “I will be as violent as they are, when they hold my life as 
worth less than theirs,” says Frantz Fanon, the healer. 
   What does it mean to be a healer? I wonder. As someone born in the Americas, 
from Caribbean and indigenous as well as European heritage, let me answer with an 
Amerindian emphasis: to be a healer is to be a shaman. The shaman develops an image-
based or speech-based technology that allows crowds and individuals to notice their 
awkwardness and what they endeavor to conceal in everyday life, for instance with the 
help of hallucinogenic drugs or chanting and the ritual eating of each others’ words. But 
in these exceptional situation ghosts speak as well in a voice that the living, in all 
sincerity, “do not and cannot recognize”.4 In this respect at least, the shaman performs a 
healing function. This performance function, the revelation of a looming stranger self 
that may be threatening and monstrous yet diminished or appeased through its 
exteriorization in speech or image, of a failure in the recognition of an alien perspective 
that must be heard and made interior from the outside, is something that the shaman 
has in common with the cinematographer and the psychiatrist or psychoanalyst. Hence 
my reference to what Jean Epstein called photo-electric psychoanalysis and to Fanon 
and Spivak (the playwright and the translator of playwrights as well as documentary 
films about a playwright who was also a psychoanalyst) as both healer and image.      
Politically speaking this is to say, first, that I accept as a central question that of 
what is it that haunts every revolutionary or decolonization movement: “whether the 
successors will remain stuck within the trajectory of domination and submission 
previously occupied by the colonizers or whether they will succeed in shifting from the 
 paradigm of domination to that of liberation.”5  This question pertains to the time 
dimension and variation of the anticipation and expectation of liberation, which is 
concealed in everyday life even under revolutionary conditions. Second, it is because 
(not in spite) of this emphasis on inconstancy and the time dimension, the images and 
voices we hear uttering the contradictions of our universal ideals and given institutions 
from the outside but fail to recognize, and instead tend to externalize as evil thereby 
foreclosing their and our future, that I must come clean on the issue of shifting from 
domination to liberation: I do not believe that it’s a culturally specific issue. To be the 
subject of a life that the subject wants to continue to live (conatus, the making of an 
open future rather than an elementary continuity) just means to arrange and rearrange 
relations that include humans and nonhumans in ever more radically open and just 
ways, not necessarily in opposition and not ever holding one end as less worthy.  
If this is the case, then space-time relations (especially time) play the most 
important part and yet, in itself, this location or relation is nothing like a substance (no 
precise location can be established without certain probability, which means that reality 
can never be a certainty) and more like the confluence of several perspectives and it 
also amount to an effect of perspective: the imaginary becoming real, also crucial to the 
question of justice as not only inter-personal but also inter-temporal, or justice as an 
option. It is also the singular way in which the cinematograph, leaping form the 
subjective to the objective and vice versa, the “thinking machine” as Epstein called it, 
suggests a worldview that is also singular. In their very singularity, the voices that utter 
contradiction in the worldview suggested by the cinematograph demonstrate that the 
contradiction manifested in exclusions and voiced by the excluded themselves is 
precisely “what allows universality to be ‘verified’ as such” because it prevents it from 
compromising on its principle and being reduced or devolving into a mere situation of 
 force or domination.6 Put otherwise, rather than having to do with identity difference or 
cultural specificity, these voices are twice inscribed in the universal, both indicative of a 
defective or failed relation and a figure of the universal, suggestive of a worldview or a 
mode of location in space-time, especially the future as it opens up the interrupted past.   
 This is ontology, a consideration of time variation as a condition or parameter of 
fullness and self-determination that is our task as philosophers and legal theorists to 
elucidate. It is not to be confused with essences or necessity, as in the talk of essential 
attributes or the autochthony of a given subjectivity (what Spivak calls the “transparent 
I,” neither “European” nor “Third World”) and less so with the pathologies—which on 
the whole refer to a condition of lack—that affect peoples and individuals as the latter 
struggle to specify ontological parameters in theory and practice (at the rhetorical, 
meta-psychological, or sociogenic level, as well as the level of our particular outlook). 
The strength (impetus) of the kind of postcolonial and decolonial theory that Spivak is 
well known for, together with Homi Bhabha or Walter Mignolo, comes from the fact that 
it has done a lot to criticize theories that illicitly smuggle particular outlooks and 
historical contingencies into social, legal, and other meta-psychological theories, 
foreclose the parameters of subjectivity by reducing them to given subjectivities, or 
simply engage in historical revisionism. For that we remain sympathetic and grateful. 
However, post- and decolonial theory has often confused this impetus and the conatus 
whose conditions we must elucidate at the ontological level. The unfortunate result has 
been to take the Third World peoples as models of authenticity, as cultural others that 
went from becoming “our victims to being our redeemers” even as their situation 
(essence?) continues to be determined in quasi-essentialist terms as one of lack.7 
 That is why it is so important to acknowledge Spivak when she says that it would 
be a mistake to make Fanon into a clay model for revolution. I interpret this statement 
 as profoundly self-critical move. Also a move that brings Fanon closer to the project of 
anthropology at the cusp of its reinvention: “the passage from an image of the other 
defined by a state of lack or need, by a negative distance in relation to the Self, to an 
alterity endowed with endo-consistency, autonomy or independence in relation to the 
image of ourselves.”8 It entails a form of universalization, establishing an exchange of 
images between Self and Other.  
Crucially, this form of universalization avoids the synecdoche of the universal 
insofar as in the exchange of images between Self and Other there is no substitution of 
the part for the whole. No Self in this relation becomes the representative of the whole, 
or the human as such. And no other becomes the representative of some essential lack. 
Rather, in order to bring Self and other together as a whole, first it is necessary to see 
them as multiple components of a single failed relation or a failure in recognition to use 
the language closer to Fanon. A failed relation inscribed within the very being of the 
term deemed as Other ( Fanon’s damnés), which at the same time can stand as a figure 
of the anticipated universal, a more integral humanity.   
As observed before in the kind of Hegelian language that Fanon inherited and 
subverted, one of the terms in the relation becomes twice a component of the universal: 
first, as the part that is discounted from the set of humanity once Whiteness is identified 
by the colonizer with the Universal to which he claims exclusive access under such 
names as “civilization”, “the civilized world”, or “Western civilization”. This failure of 
recognition becomes an absolute partition of the human insofar as the names “color”, 
“black” and “blackness” are uttered as a damnation and allowed to stand solely for the 
absolute negation of a common humanity. This entails the foreclosure of any anticipated 
future, for blacks as well as whites, which returns presently in the image of collective 
fantasies of animality and animal-like sexuality or machinery without intelligence. For 
 instance, as in the fantasy of the rapist colored male without interiority mobilized by 
Donald Trump during the 2016 campaign in relation to Mexicans and Latinos (the 
fastest-growing demographic in the United States, set to overturn the majority status 
and privileges associated with whiteness by 2040) modeled in older fantasies about the 
hyper-sexuality of African male slaves as well as indigenous women.  
This juxtaposition between the subservient position of indigenous women 
(subjection) and the fallen position into which blacks and colored peoples are 
precipitated (expositio, abjection) comes the closest to Spivak’s use of the term 
“subaltern”. It pertains to the second role of the negated term of the relation in staging 
the universal: as negated subject (or subject/abject) which turns every encounter into a 
failed relation and thus into a non-relation that takes place or is staged in each exchange 
of words and gazes between subjects in the colonial context until the present, for in this 
scenario there is no “post-colony” in the conditions of the modern, colonial, capitalist 
world of nation-states. There is only the manifestation of an impossibility (i. e. the 
contradiction affecting the very name or expression of the Universal as “Man” and 
“Citizen” since behind them always lurks the spectral figuration of the inner foreigner, 
the internal enemy or the stranger as well as such notions as purity, autochtony and 
mixture) or an impotence out of which (because hell, the zone of non-being is and feels 
intolerable) transformation emerges. 
Such transformation would consist of the construction, by way of the image of 
the other, of another image of the object and of thought, of economy, of culture, 
sociality, law, and politics. In terms of the transformation of the mode of production it 
entails to carry out and persist in what Paget Henry among others calls the “vertical 
revolution” (self-transcendence and erotic transformation) precisely as we strive to 
answer the question of how does the economy work for the flourishing of everyone 
 (horizontal revolution). In terms of the transcendence of the human it entails avoiding 
the easy conflation between “Man” and European man, subject to the impact and 
acceleration of full automation and financialization, to recognize that we have never 
been purely human and thus that to let go of or liberate nature is part of a praxis of the 
human. In terms of the geographies of reason, it means to understand that so-called 
western and non-western philosophical traditions can never be found in a pure state 
since they have emerged out of one another from the very outset. Thus, it is a delusion 
(part of the hallucinatory return of the foreclosed past and the future) to think that you 
can or should first think Western philosophy purely through its own sources and only 
then situate it in relation to a thought from the Global South. And in terms of 
transforming our mode of prediction, it could also be called a science of continuous 
variations that reintroduces the openness of the anticipated future into the past and the 
present, as opposed to a science of the reproduction of scarcity that forecloses the past 
and the future, offering us only a congealed form of the “extreme” present: the other? 
they’re just like us, genetic maximizers and possessive individualists.9  
The former is the shift undertaken by both anthropology and philosophy as 
practiced by the Caribbean Philosophical Association, which I adhere to. Call it 
“permanent decolonization,” for short. It is a move that makes Fanon more relevant 
today. 
 Let me illustrate this by means of a provocation: the black man (also the 
Amerindian, the Asian, and so on) has no ontology. If Slavoj Zizek were to say this he 
would be immediately criticized as racist, especially by some of his so-called leftist 
friends. But he didn’t say this, at least he hasn’t yet. Fanon did.11 And what Fanon meant 
was that colonial society makes subjectivity and consciousness impossible for the 
colonized, so there can be no such thing as a black man insofar as being black means 
 you’re not human. “White” stands in this case as the genus-species as well as the 
species-species of black, substituting itself for the human once humanity has done the 
same in relation to nature (which is why without species-centrism there’s no ethno-
centrism). This also means that the black man has no experience of himself as having 
ontology, because he is not an authority for himself.  
 In Latin America this is the default position of right-wing pundits and politicians: 
unable to experience themselves as an authority for themselves, their politics are often 
reduced to a desire to have the privileges of the master/father for themselves. Their 
fantasy, as Fanon memorably put it, is to fuck the master’s wife.   
 Fanon the healer was a psychiatrist, a social theorist, and a revolutionary. He saw 
the problem of whether successive generations of revolutionary and decolonization 
movements remain stuck within the trajectory of domination and submission 
previously occupied by the colonizers or shift toward liberation, as an instance of the 
dual aspect of the Oedipus complex: to desire what the father has or try an alternative 
and more just path. More accurately, he wondered what happened when the Oedipus 
complex failed to develop. His answer was: Narcissus happens. The narcissist seeks a 
deluding self-image in the eyes of others and is thus seduced by the deception,12 leading 
to “narcissistic rage” manifested as a hatred of limitations in one’s desire to live without 
limitations. In the Americas, the latter affects not only the populist and neo-fascist right 
but also the disenchanted left.  
 The enraged narcissist desires to be special without limitation, which amounts to 
being the most exceptional; in a word, godlike, or better, a god. The fact that characters 
like this enter the political arena seated on the high horse of religious moralism is 
therefore not surprising. One Latin American example is former Colombian president 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez; the example will prove more relevant if it is true, as Linda Martín-
 Alcoff has suggested, that America’s Donald Trump must be seen as an Uribe-like 
figure.13 In relation to such characters and the phenomena associated with their rise in 
recent times, we need to develop a totally different theory of the state as well as an 
alternative legal science that owes more to the insights of anthropology, institutional 
psychiatry, and dramaturgy—and Anti-Narcissus theory. We cannot develop such an 
approach here, but at least we can ask: what if we were to apply this Fanonian 
provocation to today’s America, to Europe, and to the Middle East? 
 
The Healer 
 
I ask Spivak about her views on Fanon, in particular, and of decolonization in general. 
“[Fanon] reflects philosophically on his complicity as ‘a gentleman’ of the French 
empire,” she replies, before engaging in a concise and masterful reading of Fanon’s most 
controversial work: “The middle chapter has more to do, along the lines of [W.E.B] Du 
Bois, whose work I’ve also engaged, with how not to construct him as just a black man 
and a problem.  By the end of the book, Fanon is reading Hegel. As I said, he was not 
incapable of understanding philosophy. He’s an intellectual who deliberately reads the 
Phenomenology [of Spirit] as a historical narrative, consciously disobeying Hegel’s 
simple enough injunction that if you read it that way you would stall the philosophical 
project of phenomenology. He doesn’t care. This is extremely important, and here I 
want him to mark an affinity with him. This entire idea, of the sort of ‘intended mistake’ 
Fanon engages in by literalizing philosophy, has been my formula for the reading of 
Kant, Hegel, and other Western philosophers. Fanon decides to read Hegel in just such a 
way, placing himself in the position of the Hegelian subject. This is not finger-pointing. 
Rather, he’s doing what I would call ‘affirmative sabotage’. Recognizing that what he is 
 doing is (affirmatively) sabotaging Hegel, by occupying the place of the normative 
subject, results in a very different Fanon.”  
 Spivak credits her friend, the novelist Assia Djebar, for much of her renewed 
perspective on Fanon and decolonization. Assia Djebar is the pen name of Algerian 
author, translator, and filmmaker Fatima Zohra-Imalayen. From Les enfants du noveau 
monde (1962) (Children of the New World), through L’Amour, la fantasia (1985) 
(published in English as Fantasia, An Algerian Cavalcade), to Femmes d’Alger dans leur 
apartement (1980) (published in English as Women of Algiers in Their Apartment) and 
Nulle part dans la maison du mon pére (2008), Djebar reflected on her ambivalence 
about language and writing in French—having been denied entry into written Arabic in 
her time and place, as reflected in Nulle part dans la maison de mon père, which is 
dedicated to Spivak—as well as identifying herself as a Western-educated scholar, being 
at the same time an Algerian and a feminist Muslim intellectual and a spokesperson for 
North African women, for women in general, and for oppressed men and women. Her 
intellectual and political stance is well known: it is fiercely critical of male-dominated 
society and radically anti-colonial. Djebar was elected to the Académie Française in June 
2006, the first writer from the Maghreb to become a member of the metropolitan 
learned society. By then she had won the coveted Neustadt International Prize for 
Literature in 1996, the Yourcenar Prize in 1997, and the 2000 Peace Prize of the 
German Book Trade. She was frequently named as a contender for the Nobel Prize on 
the strength of her entire body of work before her death in February this year.  
 “Assia called me her twin sister,” Spivak recalls. “I did not ask for it. It is an honor 
which I have the responsibility to live up to.” Djebar’s own reading of Fanon may be an 
instance of what Spivak calls “affirmative sabotage.” Throughout her literary and filmic 
work, she twists and turns Fanon’s central image of the unveiling of Algeria. In his A 
 Dying Colonialism, Fanon outlined the resistance by the men and women of the country 
to a colonial project aimed at defeating the Algerian nation by unveiling its women.14 
The motif proved influential, appearing also in the contribution made by Iranian thinker 
Ali Shariati, himself a translator of Fanon, to the debates concerning Western 
monoculturalism in the context of the Iranian Revolution. Fanon had depicted Algeria as 
a veiled woman threatened with her unveiling—a metaphor for rape, as Rita Faulkner 
has observed. Thus, for Fanon the unveiling of Algeria is a sign, a key to unlock the 
psychological effects violence had on colonized North-Africans. But it is also a sign of 
hope. The new power that Algerian women found through their participation in the 
Algerian struggle for liberation can also be seen as a cypher of a future in which the 
persistence of women’s equality would herald the historical realization of a modern, 
socialist, and revolutionary Algeria.  
 “My dear friend Djebar wrote in Tunis for the Moujahid and worked with Fanon, 
so she knew him very well,” says Spivak. Eleven years Fanon’s junior, Djebar was 
twenty-three in 1959 when Fanon wrote A Dying Colonialism. It is likely that she 
influenced him while they worked together (she as journalist, he as writer and editor) 
for the revolutionary newspaper El-Moujahid. No doubt she was as familiar with 
Fanon’s ideas as with the fact that he was drawing upon a connection between land, the 
nation, and women’s bodies that can be said to be as old as literature and philosophy 
themselves, found in both the Biblical Book of Genesis and in verse 223 of the Second 
Sura of the Quran, as well as in traditional Western as well as modern Arabic literature.  
 In that tradition, Algeria was represented as a woman who stubbornly refused 
the “emancipatory seed” of French Western enlightenment as modernization; who 
resisted colonialism and globalization, but also as a body to be possessed; so that 
possessing, conquering, penetrating a North-African woman, in this scheme, is a step 
 toward conquering North Africa. The same can be said about America, the Amerindian 
continent thus named by Europeans following the Renaissance Latin tradition before 
that name was Anglicized and confused solely with its English-speaking part. In the 
original iconography, cartography, and literature of the Americas, from the fifteen 
century onward, the continent was often represented as an Amazon, a warrior, and a 
she-cannibal, while at the same time as an object of sexual desire. That representation is 
very much at stake in the kind of expressive violence taking place nowadays on the 
Mexican-American border, in Central America, and in Colombia, which another friend of 
Gayatri Spivak, the literary critic Jean Franco, dealt with in her book, Cruel Modernity.15 
Such violence—feminicidio, or feminicide—focuses specifically, as Fanon put it, on the 
nameless, faceless women whose bodies become the very site of the various wars 
affecting the continent (insurgency, counter-insurgency, drugs) and whose existence is 
reduced to zero.  
 “It is through Assia Djebar that I get a sense of Fanon as a healer,” says Spivak. 
“The point that Fanon makes, which nobody bothers to read carefully, is that when you 
weigh lives so that one Israeli life, for instance, becomes equal to a hundred and fifty 
Palestinian lives, then violence emerges as the response.” 
 What is at stake here is not just Africa or the Americas, Israel or Palestine, and 
neither the colonial past nor a remnant of it in the post-colonial present. What is at 
stake, as Spivak explains invoking Fanon and Djebar, is the colonial fantasy. It persists—
as Winifred Woodhull puts it, concurring with Spivak and Djebar’s analysis—“whether 
the imagined contact between races or peoples involves a perilous siege or easy 
pleasure.”16 
 And persist it does. Consider October 6, 2015. During the Conservative 
Conference in Manchester, then UK Home Secretary and now Prime Minister of Britain 
 Theresa May informed her audience that “when immigration is too high, when the pace 
of change is too fast, it’s impossible to build a cohesive society,”17 a comment that Prime 
Minister David Cameron subsequently signaled his agreement with. In his own speech 
delivered the following day, Cameron condemned racial discrimination in the name of a 
commendable, British, multi-cultural society.18 One day, imagined contact between 
peoples is deemed perilous. Next day, as easy pleasure. The bodies and souls of 
feminized others, once the site of colonial warfare, have now become “hearts and 
minds” to be weighed and won over, conquered, penetrated, in the war against terror, in 
order to ensure security and compromise between classes in the post-colonial twenty-
first century.  
 Djebar takes stock of this fact in her writings, and of the place occupied by 
women in our supposedly decolonized societies more than twenty years after her 
collaboration with Fanon. Spivak invokes her to highlight the limits of women’s place 
and role today vis-à-vis the (Hegelian) historical, phenomenological, and speculative 
narrative undertaken by Fanon. 
 If Spivak views Fanon’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology as an “intended 
mistake” and as “an affirmative sabotage,” she also observes, again, that “we must not 
make Fanon into some clay figure,” or a model for all revolutions past and still to come. 
Instead, “we must take Fanon forward.” In other words, read him and formulate newer 
conjunctures. 
 Through Djebar, Spivak takes Fanon forward, affirmatively. If, as Lewis R. 
Gordon recognizes, “although he acknowledges the psychoanalytical contributions of 
Anna Freud, [for Fanon] the existential philosophical domains appear squarely in the 
hands of men,” through Djebar, Gayatri Spivak turns Fanon’s failure to articulate his 
indebtedness to Beauvoir and other women on its head.19 For in Djebar’s writing the 
 image of “unveiling Algeria” is uncoupled from its patriarchal origins in religious and 
secular literature, thereby turning Fanon’s limitation into an affirmation as well as a 
celebration of the richness of the women’s oral, critical, and enacting tradition, as 
presented, for instance, in her Femmes d’Alger dans leur apartement (1980), which cuts 
across boundaries of tradition and modernity.20 I believe it was the influence and 
criticism of women like Djebar that made Fanon into a healer, a trans-gender witch, and 
a shaman rather than a witch-hunter, allowing us to read him as such.  I suspect Spivak 
would agree. 
 
Concerning Violence 
 
“It is through her [Djebar] that I get a sense of Fanon as a healer,” Spivak repeats. 
“Again, the point that Fanon makes, which nobody bothers to consider carefully, is that 
it’s no use accusing anybody of violence when there is this kind of weighing of human 
life.” “Not even accusing the perpetrator of such violence and weighing?” I ask. “Yes, of 
course,” says Spivak, “but Fanon is not talking about the colonizer. He is talking about 
the colonized. He is saying that from the perspective of the one whose life has been so 
[weighed and] devalued, this is how violence comes.” 
 Thus understood, there is nothing relativistic in Fanon’s perspectivism. Rather, 
what follows is a questioning of the grounds for judgment, the weighing judgment of the 
former colonizer. Also a questioning of his assumed discursive mastery over the 
normative domain, that of law and order, which threatens to absorb the ethical entirely. 
Such a conflation of domains in the name of law’s autonomy—this is what Western 
jurists and politicians, as well as their imitators elsewhere, claim when they speak of 
“the rule of law”—is the mark of our rights-based, so-called post-colonial, post-class, 
 and post-racial societies. It leaves no room for proper distinctions between justice and 
what a certain society considers as just at some point in time. This, by the way, is not 
only the best description of today’s historicist relativism but also the best prescription 
for totalitarianism and decisionism.21    
 “Fanon is saying that the violence which comes in response to the judgment of 
one [way of] life, that of the colonized, as weighing less than another, the colonizer’s, is 
not to be judged on the same grounds,” Spivak says. “He does not say one must condone 
violence. What he is really saying is that one must know there is no absolutist standard 
unless one has been even to [in trying to] bring about a situation where human lives are 
equal.” 
 I ask Spivak whether this might be the reason why Fanon is making a comeback. 
He is being re-read nowadays against a situation dominated by an abstract normative 
injunction on violence that leaves no room for proper ethical distinctions. Or as Hegel 
and The Cure would put it, a night of the world in which all cats are gray. “Every single 
violence is supposed to be outlawed,” I observe, “but specifically revolutionary violence. 
. . .” “In an absolutist way,” Spivak adds, completing my sentence. “So we do not know 
anymore what is revolutionary violence. To an extent, the funniest thing is that the act 
of revolution is not by necessity a violent act. That is, if one is being close to Marx, and 
that is where I am; or to Luxembourg, who was a fine reader of Marx and did things 
accordingly, and I am a Rosa Luxembourg-style social democrat; or to Gramsci, and I am 
also close to Gramsci as a reader of Marx and a practitioner of subalternity. These are 
my models, although it is not up to me to stereotype myself in that way; others will see. 
In any case, in accordance with these exemplars—and this is also how it seems to me—
the idea is not to see revolution as necessarily a site of violence except reactive violence.  
 And how to understand the nucleus of it: that is a much more complicated agenda, and I 
do not think we can apply Fanonian discourse to it,” she explains.  
 “I have a feeling that if Fanon is going to be useful for us we have to see this, 
first,” Spivak points out. “Second, we must not make him into some sort of clay figure. 
After all, this was a young man who died at thirty-six. So, all the time for developing 
politically still lay ahead of him. One has this unfortunate feeling also with Gramsci. On 
the other hand, [W. E. B] Du Bois died at ninety-five. One can see in this contrast that 
figures who are political evolve in time. This is the sense in which Assia Djebar, in Le 
blanc de l’Algérie (1995), writes, addressing Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth of 
France, again.22 Yes. But now Algerian killing Algerian.” Therefore, Spivak says, “Fanon’s 
project is something that we should take forward in newer conjunctures. He already 
knew that decolonization was not the kind of unquestioned good that a film like 
Concerning Violence, which I introduced, makes it out to be. Thirdly, we must know, too, 
that Fanon not only went off from the experience vécu or the real-life experience of 
blackness into something broader, looking into colonialism rather than just racialism. 
He also, when Senghor did not respond to his request to go to Senegal, went to Algeria, 
which is not sub-Saharan Africa. Algerians are in general Mediterranean, Berber, and so 
on, rather than sub-Saharan, and in that sense the Algerians are not black. When Fanon 
begins to declare that he is Algerian, people do not understand that he is making a very 
careful statement the substance of which is to identify with the abstraction of 
colonialism rather than with the misplaced concreteness of skin color. This is an 
extremely important thing to remember: Fanon is not a chromatist.”  
 “Let us then speak of such new junctures,” I propose to Spivak. “Also, in line with 
what you describe as a sort of Hegelian progression, from the false concreteness of 
blackness as skin color to the abstraction of colonialism. What comes to my mind as 
 part of such an historical-phenomenological narrative is that peculiar sub-section in the 
chapter ‘On Violence,’ in The Wretched of the Earth, titled ‘Violence at the International 
Level,’ which most readers tend to gloss over. Continuing with your idea of Fanon as 
affirmative reader of Hegel, one could say that there is this further movement here from 
the abstract and yet more encompassing materiality of the colonial world to the even 
more encompassing and some might say more abstract but also speculative world of 
finance. A world that must have been much more difficult to contemplate in the 1950s 
or 1960s, but which for us has become quite quotidian and crucial even if we do not 
understand it, much in the same way medieval Europeans related to religion before the 
Reformation. Do you think Fanon was considering the process that had begun already in 
the second half of the twentieth century but would be complete only in our time, that is, 
the process by means of which the former colonial world would remake itself into a 
one-world of global finance?” I ask her. 
 “Yes,” Spivak replies. “After all, Fanon lived through a time when the rules of the 
old colonial world were being re-written. Bretton Woods had already taken place. 
Therefore, it is not so much that Fanon is prescient. Rather, he knows it is no longer 
about the mere reality of experience. This is a man who, after all, was finishing a 
dissertation on psychiatry. This is not a person committed to some linear, narrative 
view of subjectivity. Therefore, one has to look at Fanon in this way, as someone trying 
to understand how these big abstract commitments, colonialism, finance and so on—
which are not the same everywhere—affect subjects in specific and changing ways. This 
process of subjective change, which was also his, for whatever reason; this coming clear 
out of sub-Saharan black Africa and into Mediterranean North Africa, is what he looks 
into and declares in a language, not Arabic (which by the way he did not know so well). 
So, when he declares he’s Algerian he is saying a very different thing [about the 
 psychological consequences and implications of colonialism and its avatars] which we 
do not know how to hear. Then, what you are talking about is the much more leftist idea 
of the economic implications of the future of colonialism. You can’t have a naïve view of 
decolonization when at least you can think it. You don´t know it [what these 
implications might be] but you can think it.” 
 Listening to Spivak speak of what we do not know how to hear, I wonder 
whether this is also a case of what we do not want to hear. There is a connection 
between the two, and it is important. In Aimé Césaire’s play about the tragic 
assassination of the leader of Congolese independence, A Season in the Congo, which 
Spivak recently translated, the protagonist Patrice Lumumba is the one who pursues the 
question that no one else wants to hear. The same is the case with Assia Djebar’s 
women, who “are always haunted by desire,” as Spivak says. While taking to her, I can’t 
stop thinking about how haunted she herself is. By friends—some alive, most of them 
dead. But also, and this amounts to the same thing, by desire. Which, in turn, is the same 
thing as saying that she is haunted by the question no one wants to hear. While 
discussing Fanon, she produces, out of some testimonial evidence given to her by a 
ghost-friend, a connection between Frantz Fanon and Patrice Lumumba. When 
everything seems to be harmonious and under control, in history as in our conversation, 
the two of them enter the stage in the role of the “discomforter” (as Lumumba refers to 
himself in Césaire’s play); that is, the one who interrupts the straight story.  Such is the 
lesson of tragedy: history does not follow a straight line.  
 “There is one more thing I´ll say here,” Spivak observes. “It would be good to look 
at [the fate of] Pan-Africanism in this context. We hardly talk about these things in the 
context of Fanon, yet both Fanon and Patrice Lumumba attended the 1958-9 All-African 
People’s Conference in Accra. As I was told by my friend, the Ghanaian poet Kofi 
 Awoonor who died recently, shot at the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya—he’s smiling, 
we´re sitting drinking a fruit juice from his trees at the garden—‘well, you know, both 
the tall one and the short one were at that one.’ The tall one is Lumumba, and the short 
one is of course Fanon. So Fanon had dealings with people like Lumumba. Assia Djebar 
makes the connection when she writes about the Barbarian who has shown to the 
Romans that a Berber ‘can combine bravery and intelligence with . . . a fierce personal 
reticence.’23 Later, the female protagonist of the novel sees him, Jugurtha, that’s the 
Berber’s name, dying of hunger in a dungeon in Rome. Djebar says of Jugurtha that he is 
the first Lumumba.”   
 “There are other connections,” Spivak insists.  For instance, there is the one that 
she postulates between Jugurtha, Lumumba, and Fanon, with the help of her ghost 
friends and theater. There’s another, if one brings into the conversation Souleymane 
Bachir Diagne’s introduction to Spivak’s version of A Season: “Everything is under 
control and then comes a ‘discomforter,’” he observes.24  
 
Enter Orestes/Jugurtha 
 
So, here it is, another point of entry into history, through philosophy and theater, 
violence, and the decolonial: Enter Orestes/Oedipus/Socrates/Diotima/Jugurtha/the 
Rebel/Caliban/Cugoano/Christophe/Du 
Bois/Lumumba/Fanon/Djebar/Césaire/Spivak. Enter the one (“the tall one and the 
short one”) who pursues the question no one wants to hear. Let us call this “An Adjusted 
Theatrical Account of World History and Philosophy,” with a nod to Paget Henry.25  In 
the novel cited by Spivak, Djebar writes: “I see him [Jugurtha] again, this time ‘on the 
 road to Rome,’ handed over in chains. ‘Rome, a city for sale!’ he used to proclaim. He is 
conquered and taught a lesson. He is Africa’s first Lumumba.”26  
 “There are two theories of translation,” Spivak notes in her translator’s foreword 
to A Season in the Congo; “you add yourself to the original, or you efface yourself and let 
the text shine. I subscribe to the second.”27 Maybe we can extrapolate here. Let us 
speculate that there are equally two theories and practices of history: in the first one, 
you add yourself to the tradition, imitating its canonical figures, whom you follow. In the 
second one, you let the text shine, as it is the product of an exemplary author that serves 
as a model, not for imitation, not as a clay figure, but for influence in the condition of 
freedom. I subscribe to the second. 
 This is creative freedom, the kind that befits the man or woman “who asks for the 
impossible,” as Bachir Diagne says. He also refers to the exemplary character in history 
as one “who declares stubbornly that what everybody . . . is satisfied with will not do for 
him”.  “Thus Lumumba is convinced that Africa needs his intransigence,” and he sets 
another path in motion, one that in his case would end in death, like Salvador Allende, 
when they ruin the prevailing consensus around compromise “by proclaiming as the 
true goal for the people . . . the same concept of freedom but in his own tongue.”28  
 German philosopher Immanuel Kant had a name for this procedure. He called it 
succession, the subjective rediscovery of the maxims of the categorical imperative. For 
Kant, here following the poet John Milton, achieving a moment of rational “conversion,” 
“rebirth,” or “revolution” is demonstrably earned “by a formalism of the mind that the 
formalism of poetry discloses,” as Sanford Budick puts it.29   
 Perhaps Spivak’s seemingly innocuous comment during our conversation— 
“Fanon had dealings with people like Lumumba”—can be understood in a similar vein, 
for she engages the ethically productive power of the sublime poetry and tragedy of 
 Fanon’s text, and of Djebar’s and Césaire’s, affirmatively. Is this the point of her 
“sabotage” strategy of critical reading? If so, then let us postulate that this is the 
affirmative mode of writing and philosophy, and of truthful (as opposed to purely 
eliminative) philosophers. And let us include Malcolm X and the Panthers in the context 
of Pan-Africanism, as well as Guevara, Salvador and Beatriz Allende, and Neruda’s 
poetry. But also Spivak herself. Crucially, this is not at all different from what Kant 
found in Milton’s poetry. We may ask henceforth, what are the implications of the 
affirmative mode of writing philosophy in history? 
 “This is a very different kind of connection,” Spivak says. “Lumumba came from 
Belgian Congo, which is very different from French North Africa, where Fanon ended up. 
This is why Sartre couldn’t understand him. He was disgusted with Lumumba, 
dismissed him with one word. So we have to remember those connections as well, not 
just the story of being black, being an African revolutionary, and condoning violence.” 
 Listening to Spivak in conversation, there emerges an affirmative Fanon, the 
healer, in opposition to the purely eliminative Fanon and Lumumba—and Allende—that 
we get from Arendt and Sartre and from the neoliberals and the(ir) official story that 
represents the former solely as purveyors of destructive violence. “If you look at the 
issue of Présence Africaine published in 1962 after Fanon’s death,” Spivak says, almost 
whispering in my ear, “the one in which Aimé Césaire wrote Fanon’s obituary—
Máspero writes one also, it is a pretty sublime issue—you get a sense of how Fanon is 
absolutely not a clay figure of the African revolutionary condoning violence, etcetera. 
It’s just not on. I just want to say that to get a sense of the—excuse the word—reality of 
Fanon, it is worth reading what those close friends had to say about him. Before he was 
made into just such a clay figure.”  
  I listen carefully. Let us use another word. The one Kant used. Let us say that 
Fanon is image, the intelligence of a machine and exemplarity as such. 
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